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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine two
upcoming United States Supreme Court decisions, two recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, and one recent Florida Supreme
Court decision. Note One examines Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11 and Meredith v. Jefferson
County Board of Education,2 which are two preuniversity level affirmative action cases on which the United States Supreme Court recently granted writ of certiorari.3 The Note will attempt to predict
what action the Supreme Court will take. The second Note also examines two cases on which the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari, Gonzales v. Carhart4 and Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, Inc.,5 which both deal with the contentious is-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
Id.
Jeremy W. Harris contributed this note.
126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006).
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sue of abortion.6 This Note will also attempt to predict what action
the Supreme Court will take.
We move from the predictive to the descriptive in Note Three,
which examines Georgia v. Randolph,7 a recent Supreme Court decision concerning the Fourth Amendment, unreasonable searches, and
cotenant consent.8 Note Four examines Gonzales v. Oregon,9 where
the Supreme Court explored the power of the United States Attorney
General and Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.10
Finally, Note Five will move from federal to state law with Engle
v. Liggett Group, Inc.,11 where the Florida Supreme Court addressed
punitive damage and class action issues in tobacco litigation.12
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—AFFIRMATIVE ACTION—UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT GRANTS WRIT OF CERTIORARI ON TWO
PREUNIVERSITY LEVEL PUBLIC SCHOOL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS—
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).13
On June 5, 2006, the United States Supreme Court agreed to consider two preuniversity level public school affirmative action cases,
which are to be argued in tandem.14 This is the second time in the
past three years that the Supreme Court has visited the issue. On
June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court decided two affirmative action
cases coming out of the state of Michigan, with one involving the
University of Michigan15 and the other involving the University of
Michigan Law School.16 The Court struck down the university’s action plan17 and upheld the law school’s plan.18 This Note will focus on
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education by explaining

6. Roland Hermida contributed this note.
7. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
8. Andrew Collinson contributed this note.
9. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
10. Noah Nadler contributed this note.
11. 31 Fla. L. Weekly S464 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
12. Rick Engelbright contributed this note.
13. The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in this case before this issue of the
Florida State University Law Review went to press. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (holding the schools’ use of racial classifications unconstitutional).
14. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006);
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
15. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
16. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
17. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
18. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
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the holdings below and by providing a prediction for what the Supreme Court will ultimately decide.
PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 1
Seattle has never had a judicially imposed desegregation order.19
A majority of the city’s white students live north of the downtown
area, while a majority of the city’s nonwhite students live south of
the downtown area.20 The Seattle School District (District) has voluntarily explored various options for ending this de facto segregation
for over forty years.21 The plan in question (Plan) was implemented
for the 2001-2002 school year for the District’s ten public schools.22
The Plan specifically applies to all students entering the high school
system and seeks to provide choice between the District’s ten schools
by allowing students to apply to any school within the District.23 If a
District is “oversubscribed” (meaning there are more applications
than the school can accommodate), then the District applies a series
of tiebreakers to determine who the school admits.24 If the student is
not admitted to the school of his or her choice based on one of the tiebreakers, the process either begins anew for the student’s second
choice or the student is placed into the school that is geographically
closest to the student’s home.25 Five of the ten schools were oversubscribed during the school year that this litigation addresses.26
When deciding who to admit into an oversubscribed school, the
District employs four tiebreakers in the following order: (1) if the
student’s sibling is already a student, the student is admitted; (2) if
the oversubscribed school is “racially imbalanced,” race is considered;
(3) the distance between the student’s home and school; and (4) a lottery system. The first and third tiebreakers are determinative in 8595% of all cases.27
“Racially imbalanced” is defined as
meaning that the racial make up of [a high school’s] student body
differs by more than 15 percent from the racial make up of the
students of the Seattle public schools as a whole—and if the sibling
preference does not bring the oversubscribed high school within

19. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166-67
(9th Cir. 2005).
20. Id. at 1166.
21. Id. at 1166-67.
22. Id. at 1168-69.
23. Id. at 1169.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1169-72.
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plus or minus 15 percent of the District’s demographics, the racebased tiebreaker is ‘triggered’ and the race of the applying student
is considered.28

During the school year at issue in the litigation, the race tiebreaker was used in three of the District’s ten schools to place approximately 300 of the incoming 3000 students.29 The placement of
these 300 students affected the racial balance of four of the District’s
schools by 10-20%.30
Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents) is composed of
parents whose children were negatively affected by the racial tiebreaker, meaning the children did not receive admission to the school
of their choice because of the tiebreaker.31 Parents sued the District
alleging various violations of state and federal law. Most notably,
Parents alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.32 The district court
upheld the Plan under both state and federal law.33 A three-judge
panel for the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court,
holding that the Plan violated state law.34 The Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion and certified the state law question to the Washington Supreme Court, which held that the Plan did not violate state
law.35 The three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit then held that the
Plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.36 The Ninth Circuit
granted an en banc hearing and affirmed the district court’s ruling
that the affirmative action plan did not violate state or federal law.37
The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s various affirmative action cases, including Grutter v. Bollinger and other educational
and noneducational cases, in determining whether the Plan violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The Ninth Circuit applied the “strict
scrutiny standard, which requires that the policy in question be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”39 The Ninth
Circuit noted that the Grutter court found the societal and educational benefits of racial diversity to be compelling state interests.40

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1169-70.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1170-71.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id. at 1172-79.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1173.
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The District asserted two compelling interests in implementing the
Plan: (1) to obtain the societal and educational benefits of diversity
and (2) to avoid the harms associated with segregated schools.41
The District identified three social and educational benefits of diversity in secondary schools. First, the District, through expert witnesses, argued that diversity increases the critical thinking skills of
white and nonwhite students, allowing them to challenge and understand views that are different from their own.42 Second, the District
presented evidence concerning the “socialization and citizenship advantages” of racially diverse schools, which included the “improvement in race-relations, the reduction of prejudicial attitudes, and the
achievement of a more . . . inclusive experience for all citizens.”43
Third, the District, using expert witnesses, argued that racially diverse schools open “opportunity networks in areas of higher education and employment” and lead to students later living in diverse
neighborhoods and having cross-racial friendships.44
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that these interests are very similar to the interest the law school in Grutter identified and reasoned
that they were at least as compelling (if not more so) at the secondary school level.45 The Ninth Circuit noted that secondary schools
serve a unique and important function for transmitting the values of
our democratic society and that younger people are more amenable to
the benefits of diversity.46
The District claimed it was attempting to avoid racially isolated
schools, which was a very real possibility considering the racial segregation present in the city’s neighborhoods, because such schools
would be “characterized by much higher levels of poverty, lower average test scores, lower levels of student achievement, with lessqualified teachers and fewer advanced courses.”47 The Ninth Circuit
believed that curing de facto segregation, which is segregation that is
not caused by the intentional acts of the government, was a legitimate compelling state interest.48
The Ninth Circuit found that the Plan was narrowly tailored to these
compelling state interests.49 However, this discussion is unimportant to
the prediction that follows and therefore will not be discussed.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1174-75.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1175-76.
Id.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1178-79.
Id. at 1192-92.
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MEREDITH V. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
In 1975, a federal court imposed a desegregation order on the Jefferson County Public School Board (Board).50 This order was a result
of two federal lawsuits that alleged that the Board maintained a segregated school system.51 The Board employed various programs over
the next twenty-five years with the purpose of maintaining desegregated schools.52 As the result of a 1999 lawsuit, this order was dissolved in 2000, and the Board was ordered to discontinue racial quotas at the school in question.53 However, the Board believed that this
court order was limited in nature and therefore adopted the 2001
Student Assignment Plan (2001 Plan).54
The 2001 Plan contains three basic organizing principles: (1)
management of broad racial guidelines, (2) creation of school
boundaries or “resides” areas and elementary school clusters, and
(3) maximization of student choice through magnet schools, magnet traditional schools, magnet and optional programs, open enrollment and transfers. Using these principles, [the Board] provides a form of managed choice in student assignment for its students individually and for the system as a whole.55

The 2001 Plan requires that each school seek a black enrollment of
no less than 15% and no more than 50%.56 Race is only considered after a range of other factors, such as “place of residence, school capacity, program popularity, random draw and the nature of the student’s
choices.”57 Race can, and does, determine whether a black or white
student receives his or her school of choice.58
Each school has a designated geographic attendance area, which
is called its “reside area.”59 Students are then assigned a “resides
school” based on their address.60 A majority of elementary school
students and middle school students and just under a majority of
high school students attend their resides school.61 Students are al-

50. McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (W.D. Ky.
2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
51. Id. at 841.
52. Id. at 841-42.
53. Id. at 841.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 842.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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lowed to apply to several specialized and magnet schools outside of
their resides area.62
The plaintiffs were parents of children who obtained dissatisfactory results with the 2001 Plan and, therefore, were seeking to enjoin
the use of the 2001 Plan as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 The district court upheld the 2001
Plan,64 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in a
per curiam opinion.65
The district court applied the same strict scrutiny analysis utilized in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 in determining whether the 2001 Plan was constitutional.66 The Board articulated the following as the benefits of the
2001 Plan: “(1) a better academic education for all students; (2) better appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students;
(3) more competitive and attractive public schools; and (4) broader
community support for all [Board] schools.”67 Once again, these interests were very similar to the asserted interests in Grutter.68 The
Board also believed the 2001 Plan improved the education of all students and improved the system as a whole by “creating a system of
roughly equal components, not one urban system and another suburban system, not one rich and another poor, not one Black and another White.”69 The district court held that the 2001 Plan was narrowly tailored to these interests.70
WHAT WILL THE SUPREME COURT DO?
These two cases, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of
Education, are to be argued in tandem. The striking similarity they
share may provide an insight for what will ultimately happen. Neither affirmative action plan seeks to cure de jure segregation, which
is segregation caused by intentional acts of the government. Instead,
both plans are aimed at curing de facto segregation, which is segregation that happens without the intentional acts of the government.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 836-38.
64. Id. at 837. The district court did strike part of the plan as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause because it unnecessarily separated students into racial categories. Id. at
837. This portion of the 2001 Plan will not be discussed any further in this Note.
65. McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
66. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49.
67. Id. at 850.
68. Id. at 850.
69. Id. at 853-54.
70. Id. at 855-56. Once again, this discussion is not relevant to this Note and will not
be discussed further.
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The Seattle School District has never had a judicially imposed decision attempting to cure de jure segregation,71 and the Jefferson
County Board of Education had been released from the federal order
attempting to cure its past intentional discrimination.72 The Supreme
Court has endorsed only two compelling state interests in the public
education context.73 First, “the Court has allowed racial classifications to remedy past racial imbalances in schools resulting from past
de jure segregation. Second, the Court has allowed undergraduate
and graduate universities to consider race as part of an overall, flexible assessment of an individual’s characteristics to attain student
body diversity.”74 The crucial question presented to the Supreme
Court is whether an affirmative action plan beneath the university level can be validated by the second interest, which is “student body diversity.”
The dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 may offer helpful insight in determining how
the Supreme Court will answer this question. The dissent first points
out that although the majority talks of “segregation,” it is really addressing de facto segregation.75 The dissent notes that the use of racial classifications is only permissible to cure de jure segregation.76
According to the dissent, the majority uses this rhetorical ploy because if it is not curing de jure segregation, then it is engaging in
racial balancing, which the Supreme Court has explicitly held
unconstitutional.77
The dissent does not believe the interests asserted by the District
are valid under Grutter because “[t]he Grutter ‘diversity’ interest focuses upon the individual, of which race plays a part, but not the
whole. The District’s asserted interest, however, focuses only upon
race, running afoul of equal protection’s focus upon the individual.”78
The majority counters that these differences are unimportant because “context matters.”79 The dissent, unconvinced, argues that context does not make a plan that focuses solely on race constitutional,
especially in light of the Grutter opinion, which allows race to be
merely a factor or a plus in the admissions process.80

71. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166-67
(9th Cir. 2005), cert granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
72. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42.
73. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 426 F.3d at 1200-01 (Bea, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1200-01 (emphasis and citation omitted).
75. Id. at 1197.
76. Id. at 1197 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)).
77. Id. at 1197-98 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)).
78. Id. at 1201-02.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1202-03.

2007]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

629

Furthermore, the dissent doubts the validity of the sociological
evidence presented by the District in support of its asserted interests
and contends that the evidence relies heavily on racial stereotypes,
such as the notion that a heavily white school is better than a heavily
minority school.81 The majority, much like the majority in Grutter,
gives great deference to the government on this issue.82 However, the
dissent does not believe the deference was warranted because of the
difference in the “context.”83 The Grutter court granted such deference largely based on the First Amendment and “academic freedom”
interest present at the postsecondary school level.84 Secondary
schools, however, lack this notion of academic freedom.85 The dissent
also believes the benefits of diversity are more important at a postsecondary level where the schoolroom experience expands beyond the
classroom into the dormitories and the like and where the Socratic
method of teaching is employed.86
Although the Supreme Court could decide literally anything with
these two cases, the most plausible outcomes are that (1) it embraces
both of these cases and allows racial classifications to be used for
more than just curing de jure segregation at the preuniversity level
or (2) it embraces a position similar to the dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and
holds that preuniversity racial classifications can only be justified as
an attempt to cure de jure or intentional segregation. With the current make-up of the Supreme Court, the second option seems far
more likely.87
When the Grutter and Gratz decisions were decided, Sandra Day
O’Connor was still a member of the Court. In fact, Justice O’Connor
wrote the Grutter opinion and was in the majority for both opinions.
Grutter was a 5-4 split, with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and
Ginsburg joining O’Connor in the majority.88 The main dissent—
composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas—believed that the law school’s program was nothing
more than an attempt to achieve racial balancing.89 The main dissent
further argued that far too much deference was granted to the law

81. Id. at 1203-08.
82. Id. at 1207.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1207-08.
87. The Supreme Court’s current make-up also suggests that the Supreme Court
might overrule Grutter altogether. While this is a very real possibility, it seems unlikely
that the Supreme Court would choose preuniversity level cases to overrule a postsecondary
level decision.
88. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 396, 311 (2003).
89. Id. at 378-79.
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school and that the strict scrutiny analysis was far too weak.90 Gratz
amounted to a 6-3 decision to strike down the university’s affirmative
action plan with Rehnquist penning the majority that was joined by
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.91 O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion that was joined in part by Breyer, which gave the majority the sixth vote to strike down the plan.92 Souter, Stevens, and
Ginsburg all dissented through several disjointed opinions.93 The majority held that the university’s policy, “which automatically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.”94
Rehnquist and O’Connor have now been replaced by Chief Justice
John Roberts and by Justice Samuel Alito. Both are widely believed
to be hostile to affirmative action. Roberts was criticized during his
confirmation hearings for a memorandum he wrote during his tenure
with the Reagan White House which suggested that affirmative action programs in favor of women may be “unconstitutional”95 and for
his work to limit court-imposed busing orders.96 Roberts, as a private
practitioner, represented “clients opposed to government affirmative
action programs.”97 In fairness, these were not necessarily his own
personal views, as he was always acting as counsel for another person or entity when putting forth these positions. Justice Alito has a
similar background of working for the Reagan Administration
against affirmative action, assisting in three major cases that
reached the United States Supreme Court on the issue, and he has
attested in writing that he personally believes in the legal positions
he advocated in this regard.98 As a judge, both times that a white
plaintiff or plaintiffs challenged an affirmative action plan that favored minorities, he sided with the white plaintiff(s).99

90. Id. at 380-87.
91. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249 (2003).
92. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 282-303.
94. Id. at 270.
95. Roberts Knocked Affirmative Action, CBS NEWS, Aug. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/08/18/supremecourt/main786870.shtml.
96. Civil Rights Groups Cite Concerns Over Roberts, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2005,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/07/22/civil_rights_
groups_cite_concerns_over_roberts/.
97. Id.
98. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JUDGE
SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 12-15 (2005),
available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/alito/Report_on_the_Nomination_of_
Judge_Samuel_A._Alito,_Jr._to_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States.pdf.
99. Id. at 24-26.
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Roberts and Alito both pledged to take due account of stare decisis
during their confirmation hearings.100 However, striking down the
two affirmative action plans at issue could be done without overruling Grutter or Gratz by simply distinguishing between secondary and
postsecondary education. In any event, these two cases will be crucial
in both defining the judicial philosophies of these new justices and in
shaping the composite of American schools.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ABORTION—UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
GRANTS WRIT OF CERTIORARI ON TWO ABORTION CASES—Gonzales v.
Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006); Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006).101
Once again, the issue of abortion is before the Supreme Court.102
The Court granted writ of certiorari on two cases involving the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003.103 Both cases involved suits against
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales challenging the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.104
GONZALES V. CARHART
In petitioning for writ of certiorari, the government asserted that
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 invalid.105 More specifically, the government stated that the court of appeals erred in finding the Act invalid
by failing to give substantial deference to findings made by Congress,
concluding that partial-birth abortions are “never medically indicated to preserve the health of the mother.”106 The Act as proposed by
Congress prohibits physicians from conducting partial-birth abortions.107 The partial-birth abortions referred to in the statue describes
an abortion procedure performed late in the pregnancy term known
as dilation and extraction (D & X) or dilation and evacuation (D & E).
In drafting the statute, Congress provided an exception to the Act

100. Abortion, Race on Court’s Agenda; Observers Are Watching for a Rightward Lean
that Could Affect Previous Decisions, Including One in a Nebraska Case, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Oct. 2, 2006, at 4A.
101. The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in this decision before this issue of the
Florida State University Law Review went to press. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
102. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006); Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood
Fed’n of Am., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006).
103. Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1531).
104. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of
Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006).
105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-24, Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (No. 05-380).
106. Id. at 11 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Cmm’n, 512 U.S. 622,
665-66 (1994)).
107. Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1531).
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for mothers who required the procedure to save their lives.108 However, no exception was provided for protecting the health of the
mother.109 In omitting the health exception from the statute, Congress relied on findings derived from written and oral testimony on
the subject.110 The testimony began in 1995 with Congress holding
hearings and debates on proposals to end partial-birth abortions. According to Congress, the common finding among the experts testifying was that partial abortion was never necessary to preserve the
health of the mother and instead was actually quite dangerous. Congress passed bills invalidating partial-birth abortions in 1996 and
1997, but President Clinton vetoed both.111 Despite the failure of
those two bills, more than thirty states enacted statutes banning
partial-birth abortions.112
The precedent used by the Eighth Circuit to invalidate the Act
arose in the Supreme Court case of Stenberg v. Carhart.113 In Stenberg, the Supreme Court examined the validity of a Nebraska statute
forbidding the use of partial-birth abortions.114 Like the Act at issue,
the Nebraska statute contained a provision allowing partial-birth
abortions when necessary to preserve the life of the mother. However, no such exception was provided for the health of the mother.
Citing the absence of a health exception, the Court found the statute
unconstitutional.115 The majority in Stenberg found that a health exception was required when “substantial medical authority” supports
the medical necessity of a procedure.116
The second reason the Court invalidated the Nebraska Statute
was because of the extent of its ban—that is, its abolishment of not
only the D & X procedure but also the D & E procedure created an
undue burden on a woman’s access to an abortion.117 Under the
Court’s reasoning, an undue burden exists, and therefore a provision
of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability.118
Three years after the ruling in Stenberg, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. The Act reflected Congress’s attempt to write an effective partial-birth abortion ban by curing the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Id. at 915.
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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deficiencies identified by the Supreme Court in the Nebraska Statute
in Sternberg. In doing so, Congress took additional measures in writing the statute to ensure that it would survive any challenge. The
first modification came with a more specific definition of partial-birth
abortion. Under the Act, partial-birth abortion is defined as
an abortion in which the person performing the abortion (A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in
the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation,
any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and (B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills
the partially delivered living fetus.119

More importantly for the issue at hand, in drafting the Act, Congress also relied on extensive findings on the medical necessity of
partial-birth abortion.120 Based on these findings, Congress concluded
that partial-birth abortion is never medically necessary to preserve
the health of the mother. Although such findings directly conflict
with those made by the Court in Stenberg, Congress contends that its
based its decision on different facts.121 Therefore, no such exception
exists in the Act as presented by Congress.
As discussed above, before the Act was passed into law, four physicians sought a permanent injunction of the Act, giving rise to the
present action. The district court granted the injunction.122 The court
found the Act was invalid based on its lack of a health exception and
its inclusion of both D & E and D & X abortions.123 As to the former
issue, the government cited the Turner cases in arguing that Congress’s findings regarding the medical necessity of partial-birth abortions are owed binding deference.124 The government argued that the
court’s application of the “substantial medical authority” standard
from Stenberg was directly inconsistent with the rule stated in the
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (Supp. 2003).
120. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2005).
121. Id.
122. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004) (During the course of the
case Attorney General Gonzales succeeded Attorney General Ashcroft. Thus, Gonzales’
name automatically supplanted Ashcroft’s on all subsequent documents.).
123. Id.at 1048.
124. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). Turner
dealt with a First Amendment challenge to a law requiring cable stations to carry public
broadcast stations and local commercials. Id. at 185. Congress based the law on the findings of three years of congressional hearings. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 632-34 (1994). In the first Turner case, the Court remanded the
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, despite the congressional findings.
However, the Court stated that “courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress.” Id. at 665.
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Turner cases. The government explained that the proper application
of the Stenberg standard is in the absence of congressional findings
on the issue. The district court agreed with the government that congressional findings are due binding deference. However, the court
said such deference is only required when specific circumstances exist—that is, when “the legislative conclusion was reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence.”125
In rejecting the government’s contention and affirming the district
court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit stated that the government mistakenly believed that the “substantial medical authority” standard
was a question of fact.126 The court explained that where the question at issue is one asking “whether there is a certain quantum of
evidence to support a particular answer,” it is usually treated as a
matter of law.127 Thus, the court found the government’s argument
for deference under Turner was irrelevant.
In so finding, the court held that the ruling in Stenberg is a per se
constitutional rule.128 The court reasoned that in Stenberg, the Supreme Court was provided with all available medical evidence on the
issue partial-birth abortions.129 Using that information, the Court
found that “substantial medical authority” indicated a need for a
health exception and stated that “[n]either we, nor Congress, are free
to disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination because the
Court’s conclusions are final on matters of constitutional law.”130 The
Eighth Circuit did not go so far as to state that the Court’s findings
were forever conclusive on the issue. Rather, the court conceded the
rapid development of medical technology and knowledge could render
the Court’s finding in 2000 obsolete down the road.
In applying such reasoning to the facts before them, the Eighth
Circuit looked to whether the government provided sufficient evidence to find that “substantial medical authority” no longer supports
the Court’s finding in Stenberg.131 Thus, the court looked to the Stenberg court’s evidentiary circumstances upon which it based its ruling.
Such circumstances consisted of the conclusion that the D & X procedure “significantly obviates health risks in certain circumstances”
and that there exists a “division of opinion among medical experts
regarding the procedure . . . and an absence of controlled medical
studies that address the safety and medical necessity of the banned
125. Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (quoting Turner, 520 U.S. at 211).
126. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2005).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 796 (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit in Richmond Medical Center v. Hicks,
409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 797.
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procedures.”132 The court found that government’s evidence was not
sufficient to distinguish the evidence relied on in Stenberg.133 Therefore, the court held the government’s reliance on such evidence in excluding a health exception from the Act was misplaced and the Act
was unconstitutional. Upon reaching the conclusion that the lack of
the health exception rendered the Act unconstitutional, the court decided that there was no need to address the district court’s finding that
the Act imposed an undue burden on women seeking an abortion.134
With the Eighth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s decision, the government petitioned the Supreme Court.135 In petitioning
for writ of certiorari, the government advanced two primary reasons
why the Court should hear its appeal: the Eighth Circuit (1) invalidated an act of Congress and (2) failed to follow the Court’s precedent
by not deferring to congressional findings.136 Under the first reason,
the government simply argued that the importance of an act of Congress alone requires that the Supreme Court grant writ of certiorari.137 The second reason advanced by the government is the same it
argued to the court of appeals regarding the deference due to congressional findings.138 Again, the government pointed to the rulings
in the Turner cases in arguing that the findings of Congress are
owed deference and that the Eighth Circuit’s failure to give such
deference constituted error. The Court granted writ of certiorari
on February 21, 2006.
GONZALES V. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA., INC.
Following in the footsteps of Gonzales v. Carhart is Gonzales v.
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.139 Like the four physicians in Carhart, Planned Parenthood also challenged the PartialBirth Abortion Act in 2003. Also like the physicians in Carhart,
Planned Parenthood wasted no time in bringing its challenge.140 Before the ink denoting President George W. Bush’s signature on the
Act could dry, it challenged the Act under the Fifth Amendment. In
doing so, it asserted four reasons why the Act was facially invalid: (1)
the Act places an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose
whether or not to have an abortion, (2) it does not contain a health
132. Id. at 801.
133. Id. at 803.
134. Id. at 803-04.
135. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (No.
05-380).
136. Id. at 10-11.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 11.
139. Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006).
140. President George W. Bush signed the Act into law on November 5, 2003. Planned
Parenthood brought its challenge on November 6, 2003.
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exception, (3) the language of the Act is unconstitutionally vague,
and (4) the Act violates a woman’s due process right to bodily integrity.141 The district court agreed and found the statute invalid for the
first three reasons asserted by Planned Parenthood.142 The district
court explained that the Act created an undue burden by broadly defining the procedures prohibited under the Act.143 Thus, because the
procedures prohibited encompassed almost all post-first trimester
abortions, the district court found the Act “placed a substantial obstacle in the path of abortion-seekers.”144 Further, the district court’s
finding that the Act was vague stemmed from the use of a number of
terms and phrases which would fail to provide notice to physicians
that performing certain procedures would violate the Act.145 Finally,
the district court found the Act unconstitutional because it lacked a
health exception as required by Stenberg.146
Once again, the government advanced the argument that Congress based the Act on factual findings it conducted over several
years. Thus, because they are congressional findings, they are owed
deference. In laying out the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit also noted similar findings in other federal courts.147 The court of
appeals cited three courts all holding the Act unconstitutional.148 The
first cited the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Carhart v. Gonzales and
the district court’s findings in that case as outlined above. The court
also pointed to the Southern District of New York case National
Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft,149 which invalidated the Act because
of its lack of a health exception.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling for the same
three reasons: (1) the lack of a health exception, (2) the imposition of
an undue burden on women seeking an abortion, and (3) the Act’s
vague language. In explaining its finding that the Act’s lack of a
health exception rendered it unconstitutional, the court relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg that abortion regulations require a health exception when it may be necessary to preserve a
woman’s life.150 The court continued to explain that the Sternberg ruling held that the absence of a health exception was unconstitutional

141. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
142. Id. at 1034-35.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir.
Cal. 2006).
148. Id.
149. 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
150. Planned Parenthood, 435 F.3d at 1172-73.
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unless there is “medical consensus that no circumstances exist in
which the procedure would be necessary to preserve a woman’s
health.”151 In defining “medical consensus,” the court stated that
complete unanimity was unnecessary. Rather, consensus exists when
there is “no significant disagreement” regarding the issue within the
medical community.152 Thus, the relevant question identified by the
Ninth Circuit was whether Congress properly concluded that there
was consensus in the medical community that partial-birth abortions
are never necessary to preserve the health of the mother.153 However,
the court of appeals acknowledged that in answering that question,
the court must resolve an important issue: how much deference to
give to the legislative findings relied on in passing the Act.154 Once
again, the government argued that that the line of Turner Broadcasting System cases should rule on the issue.155 Specifically, the Turner
standard held that when reviewing the facts upon which the constitutionality of a statute is based, a court must find that Congress
based its “reasonable inferences” on “substantial evidence.”156
In laying the foundation for its ultimate rejection of the government’s argument, the court first addressed the lack of certainty
stemming from the Supreme Court’s decisions on what level of deference to afford congressional findings.157 In furtherance of its point,
the Ninth Circuit cited cases where congressional findings were
given different levels of deference.158 However, the court found that
deciding what level of deference to afford the congressional findings
relied on in passing the Act was a question it need not answer. Instead, the court stated that regardless of the level of deference, the
congressional findings at issue clearly show that no consensus exists
in the medical community that partial-birth abortion is never necessary.159 Therefore, while the court ultimately dodged the deference
question, it did not pass up the opportunity to suggest that it would
not find in favor of the government. Thus, in finding a lack of medical
consensus in Congress’s factual record, the court held that the health
exception must be included.160
Along with the lack of the health exception, the Ninth Circuit
went on to find the Act also failed by posing an undue burden on
151. Id. (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000)).
152. Id. at 1172.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1173-74.
155. Id. at 1174.
156. Id. at 1173 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S.
622, 666 (1994)).
157. Id. at 1174.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1176.
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women seeking an abortion. In so finding, the court cited Congress’s
deliberate choice to create a broad prohibition of abortion procedures.161 Congress achieved the broad prohibition, the court explained, by defining the banned procedure in a way that excludes
both intact and nonintact D & E abortions.162 Thus, like the Nebraska statute in Stenberg, the court found the Act posed an undue
burden on women seeking an abortion.163
In response, the government pointed to three distinct differences
between the Act and the Nebraska statute ruled invalid in Stenberg.164 The government first argued that unlike the Nebraska statute, the Act applies only when the fetus is delivered outside the body
of the mother. Because of that distinction, the government suggested,
the Act does not apply to nonintact D & E.165 The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Although the court noted the change in verbiage from Nebraska statute to the Act, it found the result of the language remained the same166—that is, the Act excludes both intact and nonintact D & E’s. For its second reason, the government argued that the
language limiting the banned abortion to those where either the “entire fetal head” or “any part of the fetal trunk past the navel” is delivered for the purpose of abortion.167 Once again, the court disagreed.
Again, despite the change in the language used in the Act, the court
found the application remained the same.168 Finally, the third reason
advanced by the government why the Act differed from the Nebraska
statute centered upon the intent required by the physician.169 The
government argued that the insertion of the phrase “overt act” in the
intent language of the statute clearly established that the Act does
not apply as broadly to other abortion procedures like the Nebraska
statute.170 However, the court again found the government’s argument less than compelling. Thus, the court found the Act, like the
statute in Stenberg, created a “substantial obstacle” for women seeking an abortion.171
Finally, the court addressed the issue regarding the language of
the Act being unconstitutionally vague.172 The court explained that
the vagueness creates havoc by failing to clearly define the prohib-

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1178.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §1531(b)1(A) (Supp. 2003)).
Id. at 1179.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1179-80.
Id. at 1181.
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ited medical procedures.173 That failure, the court explained, “deprive[s] doctors of fair notice and encourag[es] arbitrary enforcement.”174 While the court acknowledged that it could construe the Act
to cover both forms of D & E abortions, it decided it would cause too
many problems for the physicians trying to decide which procedures
it permits or prohibits.175 For that reason, the court found the Act unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the court pointed to the government’s use of the terms “partial–birth abortion,” “overt act,” and “living fetus” as terms causing the most confusion.176 The court stated
that the government’s failure to define “partial-birth abortion” using
clinical terms to define the scope of the procedures encompassed by
the acts prohibition would cause too many problems for physicians
trying to comply with the Act.177
As for “overt act,” the government argued that the term has been
used numerous times in federal statutes. However, the court found
that its particular use here was vague. The court explained that term
used in conjunction with the phrase “overt act, other than completion
of delivery” could include a range of acts involved in abortion procedures.178 Therefore, the court found the language did “not provide the
definitiveness about the statute’s scope.”179
In upholding the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit made
clear that its decision was not based solely on the lack of a health exception.180 As evidenced by its opinion, the court also found that it
imposes an undue burden on women seeking abortions and is unconstitutionally vague.181
In petitioning for writ of certiorari, the government seems content
with attacking the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s decisions that the absence of a health exception rendered the Act unconstitutional. Despite acknowledging the two other grounds upon which the Ninth
Circuit rested its opinion, the government is willing to consolidate
the two cases. However, the government has argued that while the
Eighth Circuit did not review the other two grounds, the Supreme
Court could address them as well as the necessity of a health exception. Despite the change in faces on the panel since Stenberg, it
seems unlikely that the Court is ready to overrule its decision in that
case and uphold the Act as written. It is possible that the government could earn a small victory based on the law as stated in the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (finding that such terms were “fatally ambiguous”).
Id. at 1182-83.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id.
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Turner cases and have the case remanded. However, it is far from
clear that the congressional findings will stand up against scrutiny
even if the binding deference standard is applied. That is, the government may have a hard time proving that the findings are as conclusive on the issue as it believes.
Regardless of whether the Court would “like” to pass such a prohibition on these abortion procedures, the Act as written may be too
flawed to save. As outlined by the Ninth Circuit, there are numerous
problems with the statute. Thus, even if a majority of the Court desires to validate this Act, Congress did not put them in a good situation to do so. Therefore, for the Court to come out and remedy the entire Act would be quite a statement. It is a statement that it is not
likely willing to make at this point in time. However, it is possible
that even an affirmation of the circuit courts’ decisions could provide
a more definite outline of what a proper abortion act should look like.
If the Court wants to ultimately see such a statute passed, look for a
detailed description of what Congress may do with its findings. What
is guaranteed is that if the Act is held invalid, it will not be the last
abortion-ban legislation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—A PHYSICALLY PRESENT INHABITANT'S
EXPRESS REFUSAL OF CONSENT TO A POLICE SEARCH IS DISPOSITIVE
AS TO HIM, REGARDLESS OF THE CONSENT OF A FELLOW OCCUPANT,
MAKING A SEARCH UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT—Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
Respondent, Scott Randolph, claimed the police violated his
Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches because (1)
they entered his home without a search warrant and (2) although his
wife consented to the search, he explicitly did not.182 Randolph’s motion to suppress evidence of his cocaine use that was seized during
the search was denied by the trial court, but the Supreme Court of
Georgia sustained a reversal of the denial.183 On appeal by the State
of Georgia, the United States Supreme Court affirmed and found
that one occupant may not give effective consent to search shared
premises against a cotenant who is present and refuses the search.184
On the morning of July 6, 2001, Respondent’s wife complained to
the police that after a domestic dispute Respondent had taken their
son away from her.185 When the police arrived at the house, Respondent’s wife told them that Respondent was a cocaine user.186 Shortly
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).
State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004).
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1528.
Id. at 1519.
Id.
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after the police arrived, Respondent returned home and explained
that he had moved his son to a neighbor’s house out of concern that
his wife might try to leave town with him.187 He denied that he was a
cocaine user and claimed that it was, in fact, his wife who abused
drugs and alcohol.188
After the couple’s son was returned home by the police, Respondent’s wife persisted in her complaints about her husband’s drug
abuse and offered that there were “items of drug evidence” in the
house.189 The police sergeant asked Respondent for permission to
search the house and Respondent unequivocally refused.190
The sergeant then asked Respondent’s wife for consent to search
and she readily agreed.191 Respondent’s wife then led the police into
the house and upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as being the
Respondent’s.192 The police noticed a portion of a drinking straw with
a powdery substance he suspected was cocaine.193 The sergeant left
the house to retrieve an evidence bag from his car and to call the district attorney’s office, which instructed him to stop the search until
he obtained a warrant.194 The police took the Randolphs and the
straw to the police station and awaited the warrant.195 Upon the issuance of the search warrant, the police returned to the house and
seized further evidence of drug use.196
Respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the police
on the basis that it was product of a warrantless search of his house
disallowed by his express refusal, despite his wife’s consent.197 The
trial court denied the motion, ruling that Respondent’s wife had
common authority to consent to the search.198
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, and its holding was
sustained by the Georgia Supreme Court on the reasoning that, “the
consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one
occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant
who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless
search.”199 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether one occupant may give effective consent to search shared
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 835.
State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004).
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premises against the interests of a cotenant who is present at the
time and refuses to consent to the search.200
In deciding this case, the majority distinguished the facts of
Randolph from the Court’s earlier ruling in United States v. Matlock,
which recognized the validity of searches with the voluntary consent
of a fellow occupant who shared common authority over property
when the suspect was absent.201 To do this, the Court evaluated the
source of the co-occupant consent rule recognized by Matlock. In its
evaluation, the Court found, “the constant element in assessing
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases . . . is the
great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which
are . . . influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its
rules.”202 In Matlock, the social expectation was that a co-inhabitant
could consent to a search of a shared premises because that coinhabitant had common authority over the premises.203
Sixteen years after Matlock, the Court revisited the issue of social
expectation and approached the issue raised by Respondent when it
held in Minnesota v. Olson that overnight houseguests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters.204 Therefore,
the Court determined that, “[i]f that customary expectation of courtesy or deference is a foundation of Fourth Amendment rights of a
houseguest, it presumably should follow that an inhabitant of shared
premises may claim at least as much . . . .”205 In assessing the relative privacy rights of cotenants, the Court looked to property law to
assess the strength of a cotenant’s rights and determined that each
cotenant has an equal right.206 Thus, wrote the Court, “[s]ince the cotenant . . . has no recognized authority in law or social practice to
prevail over a present and objecting tenant, his disputed invitation . . .
gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering
than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”207
200. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1520.
201. 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
202. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521.
203. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
204. 495 U.S. 91 (1990). The Olson Court invalidated a warrantless search of a houseguest’s room, basing its decision on the presumption that “it is unlikely that [the host] will
admit someone who wants to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest.” Id.
at 99 (alteration in original).
205. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522.
206. Id. at 1523. In making this determination, the Court relied in part on the scholarship of Richard R. Powell: “Each cotenant . . . has the right to use and enjoy the entire
property as if he or she were the sole owner, limited only by the same right in the other cotenants.” R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §50.03[1] (M. Wolf ed., 2005). The Court
further assessed the rights of cotenants by looking at the ability of cotenants to obtain a
decree of partition (when the relationship was co-ownership) and determined that this
helped demonstrate that no one cotenant’s interests trumped any other cotenant’s interests. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
207. Id.
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The majority, in reaching its decision, made clear that its ruling
was a narrow one limited to the facts of the case.208 To the Court, “if a
potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the
door and objects, the cotenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.”209 In the majority opinion, the reason for this distinction was “the practical value”
in the clarity of two rules: one valuing a cotenant’s permission in the
absence of his cotenant, the other valuing a cotenant’s right to refuse
consent to search.210
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer emphasized that the decision
by the Court was limited to the facts of the case and evaluated the
facts not on social expectations or property rights, but on the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”211 Breyer noted that the Court measures reasonableness “by
examining the totality of the circumstances.”212 Looking at the circumstances of the case, Breyer found the search to be unreasonable.213 Here, the search was solely for evidence and the officers had
not justified their search by trying to prevent possible evidence destruction.214 Additionally, the police could have secured the home
while awaiting a valid search warrant.215 To Breyer, such circumstances were insufficient to “justify abandoning the Fourth Amendment’s traditional hostility to police entry into a home without a
warrant.”216 If the circumstances were different, however, Breyer
would have changed his vote.217 Were the objector not present or if
there was a risk of an ongoing crime in the house (such as domestic
violence), there would be special reason for the police to enter.218
The principle dissent by Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority’s approach, finding that it randomly protects co-occupants who
happen to be at the front door, while affording no protection to cooccupants who might be sleeping or watching television.219 Roberts
208. Id. at 1527.
209. Id.
210. Id. The Court made clear that it would be impermissible for the police to remove a
potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the purpose of dodging a denial of consent. Id.
211. Id. at 1529-30 (Breyer, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 1529 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
213. Id. at 1530.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. Breyer places special emphasis on the need for the police to immediately intervene in the case of domestic violence, despite the direct objection of a cotenant, and makes
clear that the Court’s decision will not hamper such law enforcement action. Id.
219. Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In United States v. Matlock, the Court
found no violation when police arrested defendant in the front yard of his house and placed
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expressed his fear that such a random protection could protect the
nonconsenting abuser from a search of his home, though the abused
spouse would likely give consent to such a search.220 To Roberts, the
correct approach to deciding this case was to find that “[i]f an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will . . . share access . . . with
the government.”221 Roberts pointed out that the Court had previously decided that co-occupants have “assumed the risk that one of
their number might permit [a] common area to be searched.”222
Roberts further disagreed with the majority’s focus on assessing
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in light of social expectations.223
In Roberts’ view, the problem with this assessment was that what
the Constitution protects is privacy, not social expectations.224 Roberts wrote, “Our common social expectations may well be that the
other person will not . . . share what we have shared with them with
another—including the police—but that is the risk we take in sharing.”225 Though many social conventions shape how one acts when
given access to private information, Roberts argued, “[t]he Constitution . . . protects not these but privacy, and once privacy has been
shared, the shared information, documents, or places remain private
only at the discretion of the confidant.”226 Thus, Roberts would have
the Court recognize that “a decision to share a private place, like a
decision to share a secret or confidential document, necessarily entails the risk that those with whom we share may . . . choose to share
. . . with the police.”227
In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas noted that the Court should
have decided the case relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire.228 In
Coolidge, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment search occurs
where the spouse of a suspect voluntarily leads the police to potential
evidence of wrongdoing.229 The foundation for Coolidge came from
Burdeau v. McDowell,230 in which the Court ruled that only the achim in a patrol car before obtaining permission to search a shared bedroom for evidence of
a bank robbery. 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974). In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court similarly
found no violation when defendant was actually asleep in the apartment when police obtained consent to search from cotenant. 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990).
220. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531.
221. Id.
222. Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)) (alteration in
original).
223. Id. at 1533.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1539.
228. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
229. Id. at 486-90.
230. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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tions of an agent of the government constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the Amendment “was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies.”231 Believing that the facts of this case were substantially
the same, Thomas believed that Coolidge was controlling and, since
Mrs. Randolph was not an agent of the state, there was no Fourth
Amendment violation.232
The majority, for its part, responded to Thomas’ dissent by recognizing a cotenant’s possible interest in reporting criminal activity in
an attempt to deflect suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a
criminal or for other reasons.233 The majority believed, however, that
society could have the benefit of these interests “without relying on a
theory of consent that ignores an inhabitant’s refusal to allow a warrantless search.”234 Thus, a cotenant could turn evidence over to the
police on his own initiative and circumvent problems arising from
this ruling.235 Furthermore, the majority expressed its view that this
case had no bearing on the ability of the police to protect victims of
domestic violence.236 To emphasize this point, the majority wrote,
“the question whether the police might lawfully enter over objection
in order to provide any protection that might be reasonable is easily
answered yes.”237 Thus, as the majority readily points out, the holding in Randolph is exceedingly narrow and applies only to cases with
exactly the same set of facts.238
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOES NOT HAVE
THE POWER TO IMPOSE AN INTERPRETIVE RULE ON THE GENERAL
MEDICAL PRACTICES WHICH ARE MEANT TO BE GOVERNED BY STATE
LAW—Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
The State of Oregon and a group of Oregon residents sued the
United States Attorney General to challenge an interpretive ruling of
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).239 The rule, known as the “Ashcroft Directive,” held that medically assisted suicide through the use
of federally controlled substances violated the CSA and that the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) was not a “legitimate medical

231.
at 475).
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Burdeau, 256 U.S.
Id. at 1542.
Id. at 1524 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1525.
Id.
Id. at 1527.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 907 (2006).
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purpose.”240 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld invalidation
of the Ashcroft Directive by ruling that making a medical procedure
authorized under state law a federal crime created an imbalance between state and federal law that was not authorized by the CSA.241
On appeal by the Attorney General, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the holding that the CSA was in direct conflict with
the ODWDA.242
In 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize assisted suicide
when the state’s voters passed the ODWDA.243 The law protected
physicians who followed certain procedural safeguards from civil liability when they dispensed or prescribed lethal drugs to patients
who were terminally ill.244 The Oregon law required (1) the patient to
obtain a medical judgment that he or she would die within six
months, (2) the physician to determine whether the decision made by
the patient was an informed decision that was not influenced by any
outside source, (3) the patient to consult a second physician who
must examine the patient and the medical records to confirm the
findings of the original physician, and (4) the prescribing physician to
not administer the lethal dose.245
Enacted in 1970, the CSA’s main objective was to combat drug
abuse and control the trafficking of controlled substances.246 To issue
lawful prescriptions of the Schedule II drugs (the category of drugs
used by Oregon physicians for assisted suicides) physicians must “obtain from the Attorney General a registration issued in accordance
with the rules and regulations promulgated by him.”247 The Attorney
General may quash the physician’s registration if he determines it is
not in the public’s “best interest.”248 The Attorney General looks at
five factors in determining whether the physician’s registration is in
the public’s interest.249 The CSA also leaves a role for the states in
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 911.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 912-13.
246. Id. at 911 (“[T]he CSA creates a comprehensive, closed regulatory regime criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession of substances classified in any of the Act’s five schedules.”). The drugs are placed in a schedule
depending on their potential for abuse. Id. There are five different schedules that act as a
classifying system with one being the substances with the strongest restrictions and five
having the least restrictions. Id. The substances in this case fell under Schedule II. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. The factors the Attorney General shall consider are (1) the recommendation of
the State licensing board, (2) the physician’s experience with respect to controlled substances, (3) the physician’s conviction record with regard to controlled substances, (4)
whether the physician followed the law relating to controlled substances, and (5) whether
the conduct may threaten the public health and safety. Id. at 412.
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regulating the different substances.250 In 2001, without consulting
Oregon or anyone outside his office, then-Attorney General John
Ashcroft issued an interpretive rule finding that using controlled
drugs monitored by the federal government to assist in medical suicides was not a legitimate medical practice and that the ODWDA
was unlawful under the CSA.251
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the Attorney General had the power under the CSA to prohibit the distribution of federally controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide, regardless of a state law which authorized such distribution.252
The 6-3 Court ruled in favor of Oregon.253 The Court held the interpretive rule passed by Attorney General Ashcroft was not allowed
within the powers granted by the CSA.254 The Court also held that
Congress did not intend to alter the balance between federal and
state governments and that this rule would infringe on the power
Congress intended for the states to retain when dealing with general
medical practices.255
The Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held the interpretive rule was invalid because the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government was
broken by the Attorney General “without the requisite clear statement that the CSA authorized such action.”256 “The Court of Appeals
held the interpretive rule could not be ‘squared with the plain language of the CSA,’ which is intended to monitor only conventional
drug abuse and bars the Attorney General from making decisions on
medical policy.” 257 The Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari.258
The Supreme Court, in affirming the ruling below, began its
analysis by deciding the degree of deference the Court must grant to
the interpretive rule’s substantive findings and even more importantly whether the rule is allowed under the CSA.259 The Court went
into great detail discussing three cases that have guided how the Supreme Court decides what deference to give to an interpretive rule.
In Auer v. Robbins260 the Supreme Court held there should be substantial deference given to an administrative rule when examining
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Id.
Id. at 914 (quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Id. (citing Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1125-29).
Id.
Id.
519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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an ambiguous regulation that was passed by the issuing agency.261
The second type is the deference the Supreme Court gave in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,262 where the
Court held an ambiguous statute may also receive substantial deference “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”263 The third type is the deference the Supreme Court gave in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,264 which held that if
the interpretive rule does not fall under one of the first two interpretations then it is given no deference and is only given respect in regards to its “power to persuade.”265
The Court began to sift through the three types of deference to determine which one should be applied to the Attorney General’s interpretive rule.266 In Gonzales, the Court held the interpretive rule
should not receive the deference given in Auer.267 Unlike in Auer—
where the Secretary of Labor’s interpretive rule gave more insight to
underlying regulations that were created by the Department of Labor—the CSA in this case merely restated the statute created by
Congress, and the Court held that the Attorney General was not
elaborating on one of his own regulations.268
The Court next looked at whether the interpretive rule receives
deference under Chevron and determined that it fails under this test
as well.269 The Court held that for Chevron deference to be followed
that the statute must be ambiguous and also the “rule must be
promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the official.”270 In this case, the Court held the CSA did not give the Attorney General power to create a rule outlawing a standard of medical
treatment and care of patients that is legal under state law.271 The
Court held that the Attorney General’s opinion is also unpersuasive
under Skidmore.272 The Court under Skidmore only follows an agency
rule “to the extent it is persuasive.”273 The Court ruled that case law
shows that the CSA is only meant to restrict illegal drug dealing and

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 461-63.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-45 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Id. at 140.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 907 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916.
Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
Id.
Id. at 922.
Id.
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curtail when physicians may give out prescriptions.274 However, the
Act does not intend to regulate the practice of medicine generally,
and the CSA relies on state governments to regulate the general
practices of the medical profession.275 The Court also noted the CSA’s
preemption provision as further evidence that Congress did not intend for the Attorney General to regulate in this area.276 The preemption provision (which says that unless there is a direct conflict with
the Act and the state law, the state law should be followed) guides
the federal government to defer to the state government in situations
such as the law passed in Oregon.277 The Court also held that the
CSA was mainly meant to prevent recreational drug abuse and that
when Congress wished to grant power to the federal government in
this Act, it did it explicitly.278
The dissent began its analysis of why the interpretive rule should
be granted substantial deference by pointing out the three main objectives the Attorney General meant to accomplish.279 The first objective the Attorney General wished to accomplish was to interpret that
physician-assisted suicides did not fall within the meaning of a legitimate medical purpose.280 Second, the Attorney General interpreted the Oregon law legitimizing the use of federally controlled
substances to assist in suicide to be in direct conflict with the CSA.281
Finally, those physicians who helped assist in suicides were acting in
a way that was inconsistent with the public interest, and their registration could be revoked under the interpretive rule.282
The dissent felt that the majority disregarded “settled principals
of interpretation” and that there were three separate grounds sufficient for reversing the lower decision and finding in favor of the government.283 The dissent then went into great detail discussing the
three reasons why they felt the majority wrongly decided the out-

274. Id.
275. Id. at 923.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 924.
279. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Prior to identifying the three main objectives of
the Attorney General, the dissent provides a portion of the relevant part of the interpretive
rule which was as follows: “ ‘For the reasons set forth in the OLC Opinion, I hereby determine that assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical purpose’ within the meaning of 21
CFR § 1306.04 (2001), and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the CSA. Such conduct by a physician registered to dispense controlled substances may ‘render his registration . . . inconsistent with
the public interest’ and therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation under 21
U.S.C. [§ ] 824(a)(4).’ ” (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (2001)).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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come of the case.284 First, Justice Scalia felt that the interpretation of
legitimate medical practice that was compiled by the Attorney General in the interpretive rule should be granted substantial deference
under the Auer rule.285 The dissent noted that the straightforward
rule in Auer applied and declared incorrect the majority’s assertion
that the statutory language was paraphrased, as the interpretive
rule clarified ambiguous terms with which there could be multiple
interpretations.286 Furthermore, the dissent reasoned the majority
was wrong in assuming that even if the regulation simply cited the
statute, it did not fall under the substantial deference rule created in
Auer, because no case law supported that finding.287 Even if Auer deference was not applied, the dissent reasoned that the majority was
wrong in assuming that the Attorney General did not receive the deference granted in Chevron.288 Justice Scalia accused the majority of
forcing “term-of-art definitions into contexts where they plainly do
not fit,” which in turn created a misinterpretation of the powers
granted to the Attorney General under the CSA.289
Second, even if the regulation is granted no deference, Justice
Thomas felt that the most logical interpretation of the CSA was the
one determined by the Attorney General.290 He stated that almost
every source of binding significance supports the conclusion that the
phrase “legitimate medical purpose” does not include physicianassisted suicides.291 Justice Scalia said the majority barred the Attorney General’s decision because the Court held that an executive
official cannot make a medical practice illegal just because it may be
inconsistent with one understanding of reasonable medical practice.292 However, his problem with that finding is that the overpowering majority of authorities (including forty-seven of the states) consider the practice of legitimate medicine to not include assisted suicide.293 The dissent also points out that while the CSA is mainly in-

284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 928.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 929.
289. Id. at 930.
290. Id. at 931.
291. Id. at 932. Quoting a memorandum prepared for the Attorney General and attached as an appendix to the interpretive rule, the dissent reasoned that “virtually every
medical authority from Hippocrates to the current American Medical Association (AMA)
confirms that assisting suicide has seldom or never been viewed as a form of ‘prevention,
cure, or alleviation of disease,’ and (even more so) that assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate’
branch of that ‘science and art.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
292. Id.
293. Id.
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tended to prevent the abuse of substances, there is no reason to believe that this is its only concern.294
Finally, Justice Scalia believed that even if the interpretation was
wrong, the Attorney General’s independent understanding of the
term “public interest” is entitled to deference under the Chevron
case.295 He stated that the Attorney General is explicitly granted the
authority to register and deregister physicians and that his powers
in doing so were left in very broad terms.296 Scalia further stated that
the Attorney General has the power to refuse to register or deregister
any physician he feels is acting in a manner inconsistent with the
public interest.297 Moreover, Congress left terms such as “public interest” so broad so that the Attorney General (who is solely responsible for administering the registration and deregistration provisions)
can have the authority to interpret those criteria. When Congress is
explicit in its delegation, Scalia asserted, the Court may not substitute its own interpretation in place of the agency.298 Scalia also noted
that the majority wrongly found the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to have authority over all “scientific and medical determinations” because, while the Secretary has specific binding power over
the Attorney General when it comes to “scheduling and addiction
treatment,” there is no mention of the Secretary when it comes to the
registration provisions.299
Scalia concluded by stating that although making assisted suicide
illegal may not be within the federal government’s “enumerated powers,” it has long been practice to use the federal commerce power to
protect public morality, and this is a circumstance where using the
commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is necessary.300 Scalia
further declared that Congress has already tried to do this in the CSA,
as any real meaning of the term “legitimate medical practice” would
not include allowing prescription drugs to be used in assisting death.301

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 933.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 939.
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TORTS—CLASS ACTIONS—PUNITIVE DAMAGES—SMOKERS' CLASS
ACTION SUIT SEEKING DAMAGES AGAINST TOBACCO COMPANIES AND
INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS FOR ALLEGED SMOKING-RELATED
INJURIES—Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 31 Fla. L. Weekly S464 (Fla.
July 6, 2006).302
The Florida Supreme Court recently considered tobacco litigation,
holding in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.303 that the Third District
Court of Appeal misapplied the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co.304 The Third District reversed a final judgment for compensatory and punitive damages for
smoking-related injuries entered for a class of Florida smokers and
against cigarette manufacturers and other industry organizations.305
Specifically, the Third District reversed a $145 billion punitive damages award to the whole class and decertified the class of smokers.306
The Florida Supreme Court, while ultimately approving both holdings on other grounds, found error with the Third District’s reasoning in reaching those conclusions.307
On October 31, 1994, the trial court certified the petitioners, a
class of nationwide smokers and their survivors (Engle Class), under
rule 1.220(b)(3), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.308 Thereafter, Engle
Class representatives filed an amended class action complaint seeking compensatory and punitive damages against several major cigarette companies and two industry organizations (Tobacco) for alleged
smoking-related injuries.309 After Tobacco appealed, the Third District Court affirmed the certification of the class by the trial court but
reduced the size of the class from United States smokers to Florida
smokers.310 The trial court issued an amended order recertifying the
class on November 21, 1996.311
After recertification, the trial court issued a trial plan dividing the
trial into three phases.312 Phase I of the trial considered common issues relating exclusively to the defendants’ conduct and general
health issues of smoking in order to determine issues of liability and
302. Before this issue of the Florida State University Law Review went to press, the
Engle decision was withdrawn and superseded on rehearing, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006)
(per curiam). In this subsequent decision, the Florida Supreme Court did not change its
ruling but further explained its reasoning, remanding the case to the Third District for further proceedings.
303. 31 Fla. L. Weekly S464, S465 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
304. 46 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1950).
305. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).
306. Id.
307. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S465.
308. Id.
309. Id. at S465-66.
310. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
311. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S466.
312. Id.
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entitlement to punitive damages for the whole class.313 At the end of
Phase I, the jury found for the Engle Class on all counts, including
finding entitlement to punitive damages.314
Phase II was further divided into parts A and part B.315 In Phase
II-A the jury determined the amount of compensatory damages the
three class representatives—Frank Amodeo, Mary Farnan, and Angie Della Vecchia—were entitled to and awarded them a total of
$12.7 million.316 In Phase II-B, the jury determined a lump-sum punitive damages award for the whole class, awarding $145 billion to the
Engle Class.317 At the conclusion of Phase II-B, the trial court
granted two motions for directed verdict in favor of Tobacco,318 but
upheld all other counts in favor of the Engle Class and ordered payment of the $145 billion punitive damages award.319
Phase III of the trial plan called for new juries in order to determine “individual liability and compensatory damages claims for each
class member.”320 After individual liability was established, the court
would divide the Phase II-B punitive damages award equally
amongst any successful class members.321 At the end of Phase II,
however, Tobacco filed an appeal with the Third District, which reversed the final judgment in favor of the Engle Class with instructions that the class be decertified.322
The Florida Supreme Court first took issue with the Third District’s application of the doctrine of res judicata under the court’s
reasoning in Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co.323 In Young, an
association of citizens filed a claim asserting a public interest in a
private parcel of oceanfront property.324 The supreme court barred
the citizens’ claim because the city had been enjoined in a previous
suit from asserting an interest in the parcel.325 The court found that
“judgment against a municipal organization in a matter of general
interest to all its citizens is binding on the latter, although they are

313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. Each class representative was awarded different amounts. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. The trial court granted two of Tobacco’s motions for directed verdict: against
class representative Amodeo on the basis that his claims violated the applicable statutes of
limitations and against an Engle Class count for equitable relief. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. The Engle Class consisted of some 700,000 members. Id.
321. Id.
322. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).
323. Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 46 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1950); Engle, 31 Fla.
L. Weekly at S467.
324. Young, 46 So. 2d at 26.
325. Id. at 30.
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not parties to the suit.”326 Applying this reasoning, the Third District
found that the 1997 Florida Settlement Agreement entered by the
State of Florida and several of the defendants in the case (which settled claims by the state including Medicaid expenses for smokingrelated injuries and punitive damages) barred the Engle Class’s punitive damages claim.327
The supreme court disagreed, finding that in Young, the city sued
in its “parens patriae capacity, litigating the rights or interests common to the public at large and thereby representing the citizenry” of
the city.328 The court distinguished when a state did not sue in its
parens patriae capacity, holding that “[t]o the extent [the] claims involve injuries to purely private interests, which the State cannot
raise, then the claims are not barred.”329 Applying this reasoning, the
court found that as “the State had no right to pursue these types of
private interests on behalf of its citizens, the punitive damages
claims settled by the state in the FSA, if any, were distinct from the
punitive damages sought by the Engle Class in the present case.”330
The Engle Class’s punitive damages claim was therefore not barred
by the Florida Settlement Agreement.331
Despite the claims not being barred by the doctrine of res judicata,
the court agreed with the Third District that the jury’s finding of entitlement to punitive damages at the end of Phase I was inappropriate.332 A majority of the court, under Ault v. Lohr,333 held that a finding of liability—which requires a breach of a duty, causation, and reliance—is required before entitlement to punitive damages can be
found.334 Phase I of the trial consisted solely of issues relating to To326. Id.
327. Engle, 853 So. 2d at 467. In 1995, the State of Florida brought an action against
several of the defendants in this case under the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA.
STAT. § 409.910 (1995), to recover Medicaid expenses for treating victims of tobacco-related
illnesses, as well as punitive damages. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S467. Several of the defendants settled with the State by entering into the Florida Settlement Agreement, which
resolved “all present and future claims against all parties to [the] litigation relating to the
subject matter of [the] litigation, which [were] or could have been asserted by any of the
parties thereto.” Id.
328. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S467. The court cited interests which were a concern
to all citizens: oceanfront property, public nuisances, and zoning. Id.
329. Id. (quoting Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir.
1993)).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at S468. “The last question on the Phase I verdict form asked the jury to determine whether ‘[u]nder the circumstances of this case, . . . the conduct of any Defendant
rose to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement to punitive damages.’
The jury answered ‘yes’ with respect to each of the defendants.” Id.
333. 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989).
334. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S468. “The Third District ruled that the trial erred in
awarding classwide punitive damages ‘without the necessary findings of liability and compensatory damages.’ ” Id. (quoting Engle, 853 So. 2d at 450). A separate majority of the
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bacco’s actions and “did not consider whether any class members relied on Tobacco’s misrepresentations or were injured by Tobacco’s
conduct.”335 As the jury had not determined whether Tobacco was liable to any member of the class, a determination of entitlement at
the conclusion of Phase I was inappropriate.336
Furthermore, even if liability for punitive damages had been
properly found, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously agreed with
the Third District’s finding that “the trial court erred in allowing the
jury to determine a lump sum amount [for punitive damages] before
it determined the amount of total compensatory damages for the
class.”337 The court stated that punitive damages cannot be outside
“of all reasonable proportion” to the tortious conduct338 and cannot
“result in economic castigation or bankruptcy of the defendant.”339
Furthermore, in recognizing recent United States Supreme Court decisions, the court found due process limits on punitive damages existed and that “a review of the punitive damages award includes an
evaluation of the punitive and compensatory amounts awarded to
ensure a reasonable relationship between the two.”340 The Florida
Supreme Court therefore found that without knowing the total
amount of compensatory damages for the Engle Class, it would be
impossible to determine whether “a reasonable relationship” between
compensatory and punitive damages existed.341
The next issue the court addressed was the Third District’s decertification of the Engle Class; it found error in the Third District’s
reason for decertification but ultimately decertified the Engle Class
on other grounds.342 At the beginning of the trial, an appeal by Tobacco caused the Third District to affirm the certification of the class
by the trial court.343 At the conclusion of Phase II of the trial, the
Third District reversed its previous ruling, finding that the Engle
Class failed to meet the requirements of either “predominance” or
“commonality” under rule 1.220(b)(3), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.344 The supreme court disagreed, finding that rule 1.220(d)(1)
“was not designed to allow a district court to decertify a class, contrary to its previous affirmance of class certification and after notice
court found that an award of compensatory damages is not a prerequisite to finding entitlement to punitive damages. Id.
335. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S468.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039,
1043 (Fla. 1982)).
339. Id. (citing Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1186 (Fla. 1977)).
340. Id. (citing State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)).
341. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S469.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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to thousands of Floridians, a two-year trial, and an entry of final
judgment.”345 The court found that the doctrine of law of the case346
applied and therefore only a “clear manifest injustice” by its prior
ruling would allow the Third District to reverse.347 Finding that no
clear manifest injustice existed, the court quashed the Third District’s decertification.348
Despite this finding, the supreme court concluded that “continued
class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan [was] not feasible because individualized issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and damages predominate.”349 In reaching its conclusion,
the court cited rule 1.220(d)(4)(A), which states that “[w]hen appropriate . . . a claim or defense may be brought or maintained on behalf
of a class concerning particular issues.”350 Finding no Florida case
law addressing when it is appropriate to certify a class for only limited liability issues, the court reviewed Federal cases interpreting a
similar Federal provision.351 The court found that “United States
Courts of Appeals have concluded that . . . a trial court can properly
separate liability and damages issues, certifying class treatment of
liability while leaving damages to be determined on an individual
basis.”352 Following this reasoning, the court decertified the Engle
Class, but retained the core Phase I findings.353 These findings would
then be given res judicata effect, allowing Engle Class members to
use the findings in individual actions for damages.354
A fourth issue the supreme court addressed was the Third District’s reversal due to prejudicial remarks made by the Engle Class
Counsel, Stanley Rosenblatt.355 The court disagreed.356 During the
trial, Rosenblatt made several improper arguments, such as comparing the tobacco industry to slavery in an attempt to “incite racial
345. Id.
346. Id. The doctrine of law of the case “requires that questions of law actually decided
on appeal must govern the case in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.” Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla.
2001).
347. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S469 (citing Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 106) (“[A]n appellate court has the power to reconsider and correct an erroneous ruling that has become the
law of the case where a prior ruling would result in a ‘manifest injustice.’ ”).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (“When appropriate . . . an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”).
352. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S470.
353. Id. The court did not allow retention on fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, which the court stated involved highly individualized determinations. Id. Moreover, the court did not allow the finding on entitlement to punitive damages
to stand. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at S471.
356. Id.
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passions” by appealing “to the jury’s sense of outrage for the injustices visited upon African-Americans in this country.”357 The court
found that while the comments were condemnable and “ventured
very close to the line of reversible error,” “under the totality of the
circumstances,” reversal was not warranted.358
Next, the court found error in the Third District’s conclusion that
two of the three class representatives, Farnan and Della Vecchia,
were not properly part of the class and therefore not entitled to their
Phase II-B judgments.359 The class was described as those “who have
suffered, presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical
conditions.”360 The Third District found that both Farnan and Della
Vecchia did not fit the class description because they were not diagnosed until after the cutoff date.361 First, the supreme court interpreted the cutoff date for the class as the date of final certification by
the trial court, November 21, 1996.362 Next, the court found that determination for inclusion in the class was not when a person was diagnosed with smoking-related injuries, as the Third District held,
but instead “when the disease or condition first manifested itself.”363
Since the court found that both Farnan’s and Della Vecchia’s smokingrelated injuries had manifested before final certification, the court
quashed the Third District’s reversal of judgments in their favor.364
Finally, the supreme court agreed with the Third District’s findings that the applicable statutes of limitations barred the claims of
Frank Amodeo, the third class representative.365 Furthermore, the final judgments for Farnan and Della Vecchia against defendants Liggett and Brooke were upheld as properly reversed, with insufficient
evidence supporting their liability for damages.366

357. Id.
358. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S472. The court held that context was crucial and the
court could not consider such prejudicial statements in isolation. Id. Therefore, the court
found that in the context of a two-year trial, the arguments and comments made by Rosenblatt did not rise to the level of a reversible error. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at S473.
361. Id. The Third District found the cutoff date for the class to be the original certification date, October 31, 1994. Id. at S465.
362. Id. at S473-74. The court found that the phrase “ ‘who have suffered, presently
suffer, or have died’ . . . supports the view that the class should include only those people
who were affected in the past or who were presently suffering at the time the class was recertified by the trial court.” Id.
363. Id. at S473.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the Third District court finding that
since the jury found the plaintiffs were zero percent at fault, the Liggett defendants could
not be held jointly and severally liable for those damages. Id.
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The court remanded the case back to the Third District Court of
Appeal for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.367 Specifically, the court approved of a reversal of the $145 billion punitive
damages award but held that subsequent findings of punitive damages consistent with its opinion would not be barred under Young.368
The court quashed the Third District reversal due to Engle Class
counsel’s improper arguments and quashed its dismissal of judgments in favor of Farnan and Della Vecchia, but it upheld the reversals of judgments in favor Amodeo and against defendants Liggett
and Brooke.369 Finally, the court remanded the Engle Class to be decertified, but it approved of the core Phase I findings, less those finding entitlement to punitive damages for the whole class.370 The court
ordered that Engle Class plaintiffs could proceed individually, with
Phase I findings to be given res judicata effect in any subsequent
trial between a class member and the defendants, provided that such
action was filed within one year of the mandate of the case.371

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

